Which Groups Does Australia List as ‘Terrorist Organisations’?

AQ was founded by Usama bin Laden and Abdullah Azzam in 1988, to continue their jihad against perceived enemies of Islam following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Bin Laden gained full control of the organisation after Azzam’s death in 1989. During the 1990s, AQ developed a global network of affiliates to secure a cadre of fighters to promote global jihad.

AQ cultivates influence over affiliates and assigned groups by incorporating local grievances into their global strategy and consulting with the leaders and deputies of its global affiliates. Education and religious outreach, exploitation of local insurgencies, and a terrorist campaign against the ‘far enemy’ – primarily Western countries – remain AQ’s long-term objectives.

Sustained counter-terrorism pressure has weakened the group, which has conducted fewer attacks against Western countries since 11 September 2001 and is likely prioritising efforts to rebuild. In doing so, AQ’s senior leadership probably seek to minimise direct, public links to significant attacks in Western countries or against Western interests globally.

AQAP was formed in 2009 when the Saudi Arabian and Yemeni branches of al-Qa’ida merged after Riyadh’s counter-terrorism efforts had driven al-Qa’ida members south into Yemen. It was originally founded as al-Qa’ida Yemen, in February 2006, after the escape of 23 detained Islamic extremists from a high-security government correctional facility in Sana’a, Yemen. In a January 2009 statement, al-Qa’ida Yemen announced a change of name to AQAP, which was the name of al-Qa’ida Saudi Arabia before it was dismantled by Saudi authorities in 2006.

To increase its community appeal and promote itself as the defender of Sharia law, AQAP refers to itself using names such as ‘Ansar al-Sharia’ (Supporters of Sharia) and ‘Sons of Hadramawt’. AQAP also supports local militias against the Huthi, integrating itself into local populations which reject Huthi attempts to control their territory.

AQAP primarily operates in south and central Yemen. Internal division and military offensives have weakened AQAP. The group has experienced significant territorial losses from Huthi offensives over the last few years, and is attempting to consolidate its foothold in Yemen. AQAP has previously attempted to carry out and inspire attacks against western interests outside Yemen, and likely maintains this intent, but its external operations capability is likely diminished by the group’s current weakened state. AQAP maintains a rivalry with ISIL-Yemen, which is severely weakened and lacks significant operational capacity.

Established with the purpose of advancing al-Qa’ida’s ideology and objectives in South Asia, the objectives of AQIS are the same as those previously articulated by al-Qa’ida – to prepare Muslims for military jihad against their enemies, to liberate Muslim lands now ruled by non-Muslims, and to revive the Islamic caliphate. In his 2014 announcement of the establishment of AQIS, al-Zawahiri identified Burma (Myanmar), Bangladesh, and India’s regions of Assam, Gurajat and Kashmir as regions where it would operate with the intention to fight the governments of Pakistan, Afghanistan, India and Bangladesh.

On 6 March 2016, the AQIS media branch, al-Sahad in the Indian Subcontinent, provided a link to the video ‘Al-Hadeed News Report’. The video outlined the objectives of AQIS as being to conduct attacks on:

• the United States of America (US)
• the Pakistani Military Intelligence and Security agencies
• the Government of Pakistan
• enemies of Islam
• blasphemers, atheists and disbelievers.

The objectives were approved by the AQIS Central Shura following instructions from the then leader, al-Zawahiri.

AQIM espouses an anti-Western ideology and has called on Muslims across North Africa to target Western interests. As GSPC, the group’s primary objective was to overthrow the Algerian Government and replace it with an Islamist government. Since becoming allied with al-Qa’ida in late 2006 and changing its name from to AQIM in early 2007, the group has followed al-Qa’ida’s ideological tenets. Although AQIM has pledged allegiance to al-Qa’ida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, it maintains a significant degree of autonomy from al-Qa’ida’s senior leadership.

AQIM has called for the expulsion of Spanish and French influence from North African Maghreb countries- Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia – as well as the restoration of former Islamic regions in southern Spain (termed as-Andalus). AQIM has declared its support for religiously motivated violent extremist (RMVE) activities in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Yemen, Somalia, Chechnya and Palestine.

Currently, al Shabaab controls territory in southern Somalia. However, this is fluid and frequently changes depending on United Nations African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) counter-terrorism activity and troop movements.

In 2006, al Shabaab emerged as the most prominent militia group within the militant wing of the Council of Islamic Courts. The Council of Islamic Courts was a group of Sharia courts in Somalia who united to form a rival administration, but was ousted in December 2006 by the Somali Transitional Federal Government and Ethiopian forces.

Following this, al Shabaab established itself as an oppositionist government and insurgency fighting for the overthrow of the Somali Transitional Federal Government and for Sharia law to be installed in Somalia.

Between January 2009 and 2011, al Shabaab controlled the majority of Somalia. In 2011, al Shabaab was forced from Mogadishu and much of southern and central Somalia through renewed military intervention by both Kenyan and Ethiopian forces.

Hamas’ overarching goal is to ‘liberate Palestine’ by establishing an independent Palestinian state — comprising Gaza, the West Bank and Israel — guided by Islamic principles, and destroying Israel as a political entity in the process. Hamas supports a strategy of armed resistance in pursuit of its goals.

Hamas is formally a hierarchical movement with several movement-wide and regional decision-making bodies, which reach decisions through a consultative process. Hamas’ highest executive authority is its Executive Committee led by Ismail Haniyeh, which is Hamas’ supreme decision-making body. Hamas’ central consultative body is its General Shura Council, responsible for electing the Executive Committee and shaping Hamas’ overarching strategy and policies. Hamas’s three major regions, Gaza, the West Bank and Abroad, are represented on, and exert varying levels of influence over, Hamas’ central leadership bodies —the Executive Committee and General Shura Council — and maintain their own internal management systems.

The Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades (the Brigades) were officially established in 1991 as the paramilitary wing of Hamas. The Brigades undertake military activity on behalf of Hamas and have adopted terrorist tactics in their efforts to defeat Israel, including indiscriminate rocket attacks, suicide attacks, bombings, shootings and kidnappings against Israeli military and civilian targets. Historically, the Brigades have predominantly operated in Gaza, with limited representation in the West Bank. Hamas has reportedly increased its presence and military capacity building activities in Lebanon, however attacks remain directed at Israel.

The Brigades exist within the overall organisational structure of Hamas, subordinate to its political leadership, but structured as a distinct paramilitary wing. While decisions of the political leadership probably take precedence, the Brigades operate with a degree of independence and may not seek approval from the political leadership for operational activities.

Hamas’ leadership has historically stated that there is no neat separation between the organisations’ political and paramilitary components. Hamas’ founder, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, stated in a 2004 interview that ‘we cannot separate the wing from the body. If we do so, the body will not be able to fly. Hamas is one body.’ In 2004 then-Brigades commander Salah Shehadeh said ‘the political apparatus is sovereign over the military apparatus, and a decision of the political [echelon] takes precedence over the decision of the military [echelon], without intervening in military operations.’ In 2014 senior Hamas leader Abu Marzook referred to Hamas and the Brigades as ‘one organisation with two wings or departments.’

Hamas’ political leaders often refer to the militant actions and capabilities of the Brigades in the possessive, implying that the Brigades’ activities, including the use of terrorism, are sanctioned by and carried out as part of the wider Hamas organisation. Following the May 2019 rocket attacks from Gaza into Israel, Hamas’ leader in Gaza, Yahya Sinwar, thanked Iran for providing rockets to the Brigades used in the conflict. ‘Iran provided us with rockets, and we surprised the world when our resistance targeted Beersheba.’ Following the May 2021 Israel-Palestine conflict, Sinwar similarly thanked Iran for providing Hamas the capability to launch rockets into Israel: ‘Our complete gratitude is extended to [Iran]… They provided us with money, weapons and expertise… They weren’t with us on the ground, but they were with us through those capabilities, with which we crushed and rocked the enemy.’ Sinwar reiterated Brigades spokesperson Abu Ubeida’s statement that ‘firing a salvo of 250 rockets on Tel Aviv is easier for us than [drinking water].’ Sinwar also stated ‘we support the eradication of Israel through armed jihad and struggle.’

These statements indicate that while the Brigades retain a degree of operational independence, their militant activities are aimed at achieving Hamas’ objectives – primarily the creation of a Palestinian state and the destruction of Israel – and are publicly supported by Hamas’ political leadership.

HTS’ predecessor, Jabhat al-Nusra, was aligned with al-Qa’ida. In July 2016, the organisation changed its name to Jabhat Fatah al-Sham (JFS) and announced it was no longer affiliated with al-Qa’ida. In January 2017, JFS announced it had merged with a number of other Syrian opposition groups to form HTS. HTS is an independent organisation focused primarily on operations in Syria – it almost certainly retains no formal links to al-Qa’ida, and does not publicly advocate for global jihad.

Hizballah is organised under a consultative council, the Majlis al-Shura, led by Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah. Under the Majlis al-Shura sit five functional councils: the political; parliamentary; executive; judicial; and military—or ‘Jihad’. Hizballah promotes itself as a protector of the Lebanese state. Its various functional councils, including the Military Council, work together in a holistic manner in pursuit of a unified Hizballah mission.

The Military Council directs Hizballah’s Military Wing, which is responsible for all of Hizballah’s armed activities. It comprises all elements of Hizballah’s militia and military-relevant functions, including Hizballah’s External Security Organization (ESO). Hizballah’s Military Wing supports Hizballah’s public policy to resist Israeli aggression and to defend and promote Shia interests in the context of Lebanon’s historical and ongoing sectarian divisions. Hizballah is involved in regional conflicts in pursuit of this.

The ESO (also known as the Foreign Action Unit, Hizballah International, Special Operations Branch, or Unit 910) is a component of the Military Wing.

The ESO is responsible for activities including procurement, intelligence, counterintelligence, surveillance, planning, coordination and the execution of terrorist attacks against Hizballah’s enemies outside Lebanon. In contrast to the rest of the Military Wing, the ESO’s operations are generally characterised by clandestine activities targeting Israeli and United States (US) interests outside the Middle East. The secretive nature of the ESO makes it difficult to gather detailed information about its role and activities.

HaD is likely at its weakest point since its formation, following conflict with Syria-based RMVE group Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and operations by US-led coalition forces. HaD has likely expanded its focus from the Idlib region in an effort to evade pressure from HTS and Syrian security forces

The group became an al-Qa’ida affiliate in October 2004 when its former leader, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, pledged allegiance to Usama bin Laden. In late 2011, the group established operations in Syria through its former subordinate organisation, Jabhat al-Nusra (now known as Jabhat Fatah al-Sham). In April 2013, current Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi announced the creation of ISIL to subsume the then Jabhat al-Nusra and consolidate operations across Iraq and Syria.

The then-Jabhat al-Nusra (and now Jabhat Fatah al-Sham) leader Abu-Muhammad al-Jawlani attempted to annul the announcement by pledging allegiance to al-Qa’ida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri. In June 2013, al-Zawahiri ruled that the then Jabhat al-Nusra was the only al-Qa’ida affiliate in Syria and annulled the creation of ISIL. However, al-Baghdadi refused to follow this ruling and confirmed the creation of ISIL, later announcing the formation of Islamic State with himself as the Caliph in June 2014.

Despite now not controlling territory in Iraq or Syria, the group continues to operate in parts of both countries as a terrorist group, and retains the allegiance of like-minded groups elsewhere in the world, including IS-Libya, IS-Sinai, IS-Khorasan Province, IS-East Asia, ISIL-Somalia, Boko Haram and the Abu Sayyaf Group, which are all listed terrorist organisations in Australia under the Criminal Code.

Islamic State East Asia is comprised of a number of violent extremist factions who have pledged allegiance to Islamic State and merged under the Islamic State East Asia banner. These factions are comprised of members of extremist organisations including the Maute Group, a faction of the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters under Esmail Abubakar (AKA Commander Bungos), Ansharul Khilafah Philippines, Dawlatul Islamiyah-Maguindanao and Dawlatul Islamiyah Waliyatul Masrik and Jama’atu al-Muhajirin wal Ansar fil Filibin (AKA Dawlatul Islamiyah-Torayfe Group).

All of these groups adhere to a violent jihadist ideology which predated Islamic State’s existence. These groups publicly pledged allegiance together to Islamic State in December 2015, and again in 2019, and have since undertaken terrorist acts that Islamic State claimed responsibility for.

Since the conclusion of the Marawi Conflict in October 2017, and after reconstituting following their losses, the group has conducted increasingly frequent and violent attacks against Philippines government and local sectarian targets. This has included the introduction of suicide bombings into their ongoing operations, welcoming foreign fighters into their ranks, allowing women to play operational roles, and attempts to expand their presence into Manila to conduct attacks.

IS-Libya is an officially recognised Islamic State affiliate adhering to Islamic State’s global jihadist ideology and following an extreme interpretation of Islam which is anti-Western, promotes sectarian violence and violently targets those who do not agree with its interpretation. IS-Libya seeks to assist Islamic State in its goal of creating an Islamic caliphate.

IS-Libya shares Islamic State’s goals of consolidating territory under its control and expanding its territorial gains within Libya. The group’s stated aim is for Libya to be the ‘vanguard of the Caliphate’. IS-Libya has made public its aims to establish three Islamic State provinces in Libya—Barqah, Fezzan and Tripolitania—and remove the United Nations-backed transitional Government of National Accord.

In November 2014, the then Islamic State leader, al-Baghdadi, announced that he had accepted the oath of allegiance from Islamic Shura Youth Council and created the IS-Libya ‘branch’. Al-Baghdadi declared three wilayats or provinces: Barqa (eastern Libya) with Derna as its headquarters; Tarablus (Tripoli) with Sirte as its headquarters; and Fezzan (southern Libya). Following the fall of Sirte to government forces in late 2016, and other losses, IS-Libya retreated into the desert areas of central Libya where it re-built its fighting forces.

In December 2018, IS-Libya recommenced attacks in major population centres.

Following the death of Islamic State leader Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Quraysh, in March 2022, IS-Libya publicly pledged allegiance to the ‘new caliph’ of Abu-Hassan al-Hashimi Al-Quraysh.

IS-Sinai seeks to assist ISIL to establish an Islamic caliphate covering historic greater Syria (Iraq, Syria and other parts of the Levant). ISIL has tasked IS-Sinai to help establish the caliphate in Egypt’s Sinai and, over the longer-term, historic Palestine (Israel and the Palestinian Territories). In achieving this, IS-Sinai seeks to eliminate the Egyptian government and to realise ISIL’s goal of establishing a Salafist-orientated Islamic state in Egypt.

On 9 November 2014, Egypt-based extremist group Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (ABM) pledged allegiance to ISIL and its then leader, Abu Bakr al Baghdadi. Following the pledge, the group adopted the name IS-Sinai and became a recognised ISIL affiliate. IS-Sinai has pledged allegiance to successive Islamic State leaders, most recently Abu al-Hassan al-Hashemi al-Qurayshi.

Before pledging allegiance to ISIL, ABM mainly carried out attacks against Israeli and Egyptian Government interests, including Egypt’s tourism industry. Since becoming an affiliate of ISIL, IS-Sinai has also claimed attacks on foreign and sectarian interests, including the bombing of a Russian passenger aircraft, the execution of a Croatian citizen, and attacks on Egyptian Coptic Christians.

IS Somalia’s primary objective is to establish an Islamic Caliphate in the Horn of Africa based on the application of Sharia law consistent with the global jihadist ideology of the proscribed terrorist organisation Islamic State. On 25 December 2017, IS Somalia promoted attacks against Western States in a video and called for Muslims, especially in East Africa, to join them. During the video, an IS Somalia fighter speaking in English told would-be supporters that killing an infidel was their ‘ticket out of hell’. On 25 December 2017 IS Somalia also pledged allegiance to Islamic State, and re-pledged allegiance to the new leader of Islamic State, Sheik Abu-al-Hassan al-Hashimi al-Qurashi, on 15 March 2022.

During the announcement, the leader of JNIM, Iyad ag Ghali, renewed the groups’ pledges of allegiance to the emir of AQIM, the emir of al-Qa’ida, and to the leader of the Taliban.

JI’s charter and operating manual, the General Guide for the Struggle of the al-Jama’ah al-Islamiyah (PUPJI) outlines the religious principles and administrative aspects underlying JI’s primary objectives. These entail establishing a support base of followers and then, through armed struggle, creating an Islamist state in Indonesia and eventually a regional caliphate incorporating Malaysia, Singapore and the southern Philippines. The PUPJI has been complemented by a new doctrine (known as TAS-TOS) and strategy (Tamkin), which encourage JI members to engage in politics and institutional change in support of JU’s strategic agenda, and outlines processes to maintain secrecy and avoid detection by authorities. While JI is willing to engage in politics as long as it aligns with its long-term strategy, the group continues to pursue the violent overthrow of the Indonesian Government and in line with the principles set out in PUPJI likely intends to return to large-scale attack planning in the future.

Specifically, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party’s nationalist ideology encompasses the rights of Kurds to maintain their Kurdish ethnic identity. Further to its nationalist objectives, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party aims to monopolise Kurdish political power, including by attacking the interests of rival political parties. However, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party primarily conducts attacks against the Turkish government and security forces.

Lashkar-e-Tayyiba has declared that democracy is antithetical to Islamic law and that its jihad requires work to turn Pakistan itself into an Islamic state. The Global Terrorism Index 2020 listed Lashkar-e-Tayyiba as one of the most active groups in the Jammu and Kashmir region.

Action taken by the Pakistani Government to combat financial assistance for terrorism have put a degree of pressure on Lashkar-e-Tayyiba’s operations in Pakistan. Despite this, and the arrest of senior members of Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, the organisation remains operational in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the Jammu and Kashmir region.

NSO is inspired by Siege, a compilation of newsletters, interviews and speeches written by prominent national socialist James Mason. In Siege, Mason calls for destruction of the ‘System’ (the perceived Jewish-controlled state) through violence and subsequent installation of a national socialist regime. Mason proposes strategies and tactics to achieve this, predominantly leaderless resistance involving lone-actor terrorist attacks. Mason has had close contact with members of NSO (then AWD) and described himself as an ‘advisor’ to the group. In February 2021, Mason was proscribed as a terrorist entity by the Government of Canada.

In March 2020, AWD publicly claimed its disbandment, following the arrests of multiple leadership figures by US law enforcement. In July 2020, a national socialist website announced the creation of NSO, which described itself as ‘an organisation founded and led by the remaining leadership of AWD.’ A video uploaded to the group’s Odysee account in May 2021 stated that NSO had learned from mistakes that AWD made, and that NSO has a strong executive leadership and a clear national socialist worldview with the goal to ‘build an Aryan, national socialist world by any means necessary.’ NSO is assessed to be a direct continuation of AWD, likely rebranded with the intention of avoiding law enforcement attention.

NSO was announced four months after AWD publicly disbanded due to law enforcement activity, claims to maintain the same leadership as AWD, and has explicitly declared an intent to pursue the same objectives.

Neo-Jama’at Mujahideen Bangladesh’s overall goals are tied to the broader Islamic State aims of establishing Salafist-oriented Islamic states in the Syria/Iraq region and areas with majority Sunni Muslim populations. Neo-Jama’at Mujahideen Bangladesh aims to conduct attacks in India and Bangladesh to destabilise the governments in the region and support the establishment of Islamic states in those areas.

Neo-Jama’at Mujahideen Bangladesh favours ‘lone-wolf’ or small group attacks, which is likely a reflection of the group’s reliance on online engagement and organisation.

Palestinian Islamic Jihad focuses almost exclusively on militant activities that further its objectives. As such, Palestinian Islamic Jihad’s military wing, the al-Quds Brigades, and the organisation as a whole are indistinguishable. The al-Quds Brigades claim responsibility for attacks on behalf of Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and its statements are disseminated via the al-Quds Brigades-run website or Palestinian Islamic Jihad affiliated media outlets.

Palestinian Islamic Jihad primarily operates in Gaza, but has offices elsewhere in the Middle East, including in Syria and Lebanon.

SKD was formed in March 2018 as a splinter group of System Resistance Network (SRN), which is proscribed by the UK Government as an alias of extreme right-wing terrorist organisation National Action.

The Base espouses a national socialist and accelerationist ideology – preparing and pushing for a ‘race war’, which it believes will cause societal collapse and the subsequent creation of a ‘white ethno-state’. As accelerationists, members of The Base believe societal collapse can be expedited through violence, including lone-actor terrorist attacks.

The Base is directly inspired by Siege, a compilation of newsletters, interviews and speeches written by prominent national socialist James Mason. In Siege, Mason calls for destruction of the ‘System’ (the perceived Jewish-controlled state) through violence and subsequent installation of a national socialist regime. Mason proposes strategies and tactics to achieve this, predominantly leaderless resistance involving lone-actor terrorist attacks. In February 2021, Mason was proscribed as a terrorist entity by the Government of Canada.

The Base’s decentralised structure was intended to protect the broader network if any one cell was compromised. In spite of this, multiple members were arrested in early 2020 when covert attack planning was disrupted by US law enforcement. Although law enforcement disruptions degraded the group’s ability to operate, The Base continued to exist as an organisation – a leaked draft manifesto from early 2021 stated ‘The Base was forced underground, bruised but not broken’.

Recent information indicates remaining members of The Base, including Nazzaro, are rebuilding the group – including through recruiting new members and organising paramilitary training events. This follows an unsuccessful attempt by Nazzaro to establish a group separate from The Base in late 2020, an idea which he had abandoned by March 2021. Given the group’s accelerationist ideology, history of covert attack planning, likely recent increase in operational security measures, and continued paramilitary training activities, available information supports a conclusion that The Base continues to prepare its members to engage in violence against ethnic minorities and ideological opponents.

In response to Canada proscribing the Base as a terrorist organisation in February 2021, Nazzaro claimed the group was not a terrorist organisation, but rather a ‘survivalism and self-defence network’. However, The Base has been consistently marketed as a ‘legal’ survivalism and self-defence network since at least 2019, while at the same time preparing, planning and advocating terrorist acts. Although The Base has likely increased its operational security since being ‘forced underground’ in 2020, it is unlikely that the group’s objectives, which involve accelerating the collapse of society through violence, have changed.